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School Board Authority and the Right
of Public School Teachers to NegotiateA Legal Analysis
Reynolds C. Seitz*
Since 1935 with the passage of the Notional Labor Relations Act
(Wagner Act) creating the National Labor Relations Board, millions
of workers in the private sector of employment have been given the
right to organize and to bargain or negotiate collectively with their
employers on "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment." Today the right is widely exercised in the field of
private employment. The opportunity for public employees to
negotiate with their employers was not demanded too frequently until
after World War II. At that time public employees, including
teachers, began to press for the right, and the pressure has been
increasing greatly year by year. The demand is identical to that made
by employees in the private sphere, which resulted in the Wagner Act.
The pressure is for the right to join organizations, including unions,
and through such organizations to negotiate on wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment.
Realistically, the hurdle erected at one time by some courts, and
legislative bodies2 to prevent public employees from joining employee
organizations, including unions, no longer exists. Today it seems
certain that the first amendment, through its protection of freedom to
assemble, insures the right to join an employee organization.
The issue with which this article deals still remains: whether there
*
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is an infringement on the legislative power of the school board if it is
required to negotiate with teachers through representatives of their
choosing.
A logical approach to a discussion of the right of teachers to
negotiate versus school board authority requires an effort to give some
meaning to the term "negotiation." If the term carried only a
connotation that teachers through their representatives can present
certain requests to a school board or its representatives and both sets
of representatives may talk about the requests to the extent the school
board permitted and for such length of time as the board made
available, there would be no need for this article. The law cannot
prohibit any individual or group from making a request of an
employer-even if the employer is a public employer. The law cannot
keep the public employer from discussing the matter presented if it
elects to do so. There is nothing new about representatives of teachers
and school boards carrying on talks prompted by requests made by
teachers. Indeed, in certain school districts this has occurred since the
formation of the district.
If, however, "negotiation" means imposing a procedure which
(1) removes from a school board the sole discretion as to whether to
discuss with teachers their requests and how much time to make
available for such talks and (2) dictates to the board certain
responsibilities by way of responses, it becomes necessary to determine
the legality of such imposition; that is, whether the procedure results
in an infringement upon school board authority. Certainly, if the
imposed procedure takes away from the school board the ultimate
authority to fix hours, wages and conditions of work, it can validly be
argued that there is an illegal infringement upon the legislative power
of the school board.
The issue of infringement on school board authority can arise
realistically only when a state has passed a statute which reflects the
intent of requiring a school board to negotiate or bargain collectively,
in good faith on wages, hours and other conditions of employment
with a union or association that properly represents the teachers.
Statutes which merely give the right to teacher organizations to "meet
and confer" or to engage in "conferences and negotiations" with
3. Educators would prefer to have a statute use the term "professional negotiations." If
instead the term used is "collective bargaining" or just "negotiations", the legislation is using
synonymous terms. The insertion of the word "professional" does not legally dictate any
different approach to negotiations or bargaining. If the representatives are men of integrity, it
will not direct any different ethical approach.
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school boards on hours, wages and working conditions are easily
susceptible to the construction that they lack an intent to require
professional negotiations or collective bargaining! Terms such as
"meet and confer" and "conferences and negotiations" do not
necessarily connote any particular technique. Therefore, it can be
argued logically that such terms do not give rights to teachers which
infringe upon school board authority.
The chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in writing the
majority opinion in Joint School District No. 8-v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board shows clearly that such is his belief. It
would require a very clear legislative history to import into "meet and
confer" or "conferences and negotiations" the imposition of any
particular bargaining or negotiating technique.
The type of statute which clearly shows a legislative intent to
prescribe a certain negotiating technique for the school board is one
which requires the parties to negotiate or bargain in good faith on
wages, hours or other terms and conditions of employment. It is the
term "good faith" which imparts intent into such a statute. These
statutes do not require bargaining with individual employees; rather,
they require exclusive bargaining either with the association or union
selected by a majority vote or with a council comprised according to
some proportional formula of individuals from the various organizations
which teachers have selected as their representatives.' Such statutes
avoid the constitutional attack that every individual has a right to present a grievance or demand to his governmental employer by reserving
specifically such a right. The public employer is not, however,
obligated to bargain with the individual. The right given to the
individual employee is, nevertheless, a valuable one because the public
employer can have the attitude of the individual in mind when it
carries on negotiations with the representatives of the employees.
The National Labor Relations Board, the lower federal courts
and the United States Supreme Court have given meaning to the good
faith requirement in collective bargaining, which was dictated by
Congress in the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act)
4. Such was the interpretation of Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1961) (which uses the words
"conferences and negotiations") by the 2 to I majority of the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board in Moes v. City of New Berlin, Case IV, Doc. # 7293 (1966).
5. 37 Wis. 2d 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967).
6. The California statute presents an example of a proportional representation scheme.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3501 (1966), as anended, (Supp. 1968) and CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 1308088 (Supp. 1968).
7. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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It appears improbable that the state labor boards and courts will
require any more by way of negotiating techniques than what is
required by the federal courts and the NLRB in construing the good
faith bargaining requirement.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to look at the NLRB and federal
court decisions delineating the techniques required by the dictate of
good faith bargaining in order to predict the probable judicial
construction of a state statute which orders good faith negotiating in
the field of public employment. This study should permit a conclusion
as to whether the requirements of such statutes constitute an
infringement on school board authority.
Initially, the crucial question is whether the direction of a statute
to bargain in good faith on wages, hours and working conditions
imposes upon the school board a duty to make concessions. If the
statute were to dictate to the school board a bargaining technique
which required capitulation or concessions on certain demands of the
representative of the teachers, it would be difficult to defend against
the charge of infringement upon the legislative power of school
boards.
Statutes are likely to speak out specifically against the making of
concessions. .The pattern followed by the statute may be that
enunciated by the Taft-Hartley Act, which pointedly states that the
obligation to bargain in good faith "does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." '
There is no decision on record which holds that good faith
bargaining requires the making of a concession. This was, indeed, the
attitude of courts even under the Wagner Act, which did not contain
the specific pronouncement that good faith bargaining did not compel
either party to make a concession. The United States Supreme Court
in the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation case which upheld the
constitutionality of the Wagner Act, stated:
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It
does not compel any agreement whatever . . . .The theory of the Act is that
free opportunity for negotiations with accredited representatives of the employees
is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and
agreements which the Act itself does not attempt to compel?

The NLRB and the courts did, however, tussle with another
question which arose by reason of the directive of good faith
bargaining in the Wagner Act. The question was whether the
8.
9.

Id.
301 U.S. I, 45 (1937) (emphasis added).
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employer was obligated to make a counterproposal when it received
the demands from the representative of the employees. Could
counterproposals be equated to concessions, or were they something
different?
In early cases interpreting the Wagner Act, the NLRB and the
courts indicated an unwillingness to state flatly that counterproposals
were not required. In enforcing an NLRB order which required the
employer to bargain with the union and in reacting to the employer's
refusal to make a counterproposal following rejection of the union's
proposals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated:
A counter proposal is not indispensable to a bargaining, when from the
discussion it is apparent that what the one party would thus offer is wholly
unacceptable to the other. Still when a counter proposal is directly asked for, it
ought to be made, for the resistance in discussion may have been only strategy
and not a fixed final intention. 0

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
commented:
There must be common willingness among the parties to discuss freely and fully
their respective claims and demands, and when they are opposed, to justify them
on reason. When the proffered support fails to persuade, or if, for any cause,
resistance to the claim remains, it is then that compromise comes into play. But,
agreement by way of compromise cannot be expected unless the one rejecting a
claim or demand is willing to make a counter suggestion. Refusal of an employer
to make counter proposals on invitation of the union after rejecting the union's
proposals may go to support a want of good faith on the part of the employer
.
and hence a refusal to bargain under the Act. ....

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit uttered
quite the same philosophy relative to counterproposals. 12 At the time
the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Wagner Act were being
discussed, the chairman of the NLRB made it clear that he did not
want to remove from the possibility of an unfair labor practice the
failure to make a counterproposal. He argued that the failure to make
such a proposal may be evidence of bad faith, whereas a failure to
3
make a concession is not such evidence.1
The appearance of the provision in the Taft-Hartley Amendments
specifically indicating that the obligation to bargain in good faith
"does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
10.
II.
12.

Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
NLRB v. George P. Pilling& Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941) (emphasis added).
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).

13. Paul Herzog at Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22, Before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. IstSess. 1886 (1947).
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making of a concession"' 4 did not directly answer the question as to
whether the failure to make counterproposals was evidence of a failure
to bargain in good faith. In Landis Tool Co., t5 the NLRB was
concerned about employer unwillingness to comply with a request for
a counterproposal when the union indicated it was willing to consider
"any counterproposal the employer might make."" A close analysis
of all of the cases speaking of the failure to make counterproposals as
evidence of bad faith bargaining, both under the Wagner Act and
later, reveals that the failure to make a counterproposal is just one
piece of evidence in the totality of employer conduct which may point
to the fact that the employer did not come to the bargaining table
with an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement-which
is the fundamental requirement of good faith bargaining.'7
It is necessary now to relate the state of the law on the need to
make counterproposals to our basic interest as to whether the
statutory directive of good faith bargaining invades the legislative
power of the school board. If state courts were to be influenced by
certain broad language of decisions facing up to the need to make
counterproposals in response to demands of the representatives of
teachers and were to hold that a counterproposal must be made to
presented demands, it would be difficult not to agree that a technique
is being required that does infringe upon the legislative authority of
the school board. If, however, independent evidence reveals that the
school board has no intention of negotiating an agreement, it would
not be improper for a state employment relations board or a court to
find that a refusal to offer a counterproposal bolsters the evidence
which adds up to a refusal to bargain in good faith. Such a holding
would not seem to invade school board authority.
In most cases, of course, it should be recognized that if parties
approach the bargaining table, counterproposals will be made
voluntarily. The United States Supreme Court in speaking of
collective bargaining has said: "[A]lthough it is not possible to say
whether a satisfactory solution could be reached, national labor policy
is founded upon the congressional determination that the chances are
good enough to warrant subjecting such issues to the process of
14. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
15. 89 N.L.R.B. 503 (1950).
16. The Third Circuit read the facts differently and felt that counterproposals had been
made. NLRB v. Landis Tool Co., 193 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1952).
17. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939), enjbrced, 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir,
1940).
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collective negotiation."'" Similar philosophy prompts the prediction
that if the school board enters the negotiations with an attitude of
good faith, it will very frequently voluntarily make counterproposals.
Since compulsion is not involved, there can be no issue of
infringement on school board authority.
The dictates of good faith bargaining will always impose upon
the school board, without any possibility of infringing upon authority,
the duty to explain its position and give reasons for the stand it
takes."
A problem closely allied to the problem of counterproposals is
raised by a fact situation which makes it possible to conclude that the
representative of the employees comes away from the negotiating table
with little of value. Can an employment relations board or a court in
such circumstances infer bad faith in bargaining? The Fifth Circuit
responded to this question in White v. NLRB. In that case the court
said: "[W]e may assume that the Board could find that the terms of
the contract insisted upon by the company . . . would in fact have
left the union in no better position than if it had no contract.12 The
court was unwilling to find bad faith just because of such outcome. It
quoted with approval the comment of the United States Supreme
Court that "Congress provided expressly that the Board should not
pass upon the desirability of the substantial terms of labor
agreements." ' 21 The Fifth Circuit was careful, however, to qualify its
position by stating that it did "not hold that under no possible
circumstances can the mere content of the various proposals and
counter proposals of management and union be sufficient evidence of
' 22 It
a want of good faith to justify a holding to that effect.
continued: "[W]e can conceive of one party to such bargaining
procedure suggesting proposals of such a nature or type or couched in
such objectionable language that they would be calculated to disrupt
any serious negotiations."' z It is important to understand that the
facts in the White case revealed that the company showed a
willingness to discuss all union proposals and explain its position on
all points. The one dissenting judge in White cautioned against the
need to protect against merely going through the motions of collective
18.
19.
N.L.R.B.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 214 (1964).
See Capital Aviation, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 745 (1965); Dierks Forests, Inc., 148
923 (1964).
255 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1958).
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408-09 (1952).
255 F.2d at 569.
Id.
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bargaining. He felt that the NLRB must take cognizance of the
reasonableness of positions taken by the employer.
If the state courts follow the philosophy of the Fifth Circuit, it is
apparent that good faith bargaining does not infringe upon school
board legislative authority. This is so even if the courts acknowledge
that White is right when it recognizes that there may be "possible
circumstances" which would induce a board or court to find bad faith
after looking at the content of proposals. If those "possible
circumstances" are confined to the extreme situations where the
demands can be said to be insulting, there surely could be no realistic
claim of infringement upon school board authority. Of course, if a
decision as to bad faith was made on the basis of the philosophy of
the dissenter in White, it appears clear that there would be an
infringement upon the legislative power of the school board.
The basic test to determine if the techniques required by the
dictate of good faith negotiating constitute an infringement upon the
legislative authority of the school board is whether the board is
required to capitulate or make concessions to demands. It cannot be
denied that the ultimate responsibility for a decision must be solely
that of the school board. It seems unrealistic, however, to conclude, as
suggested by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,2 that if good faith
bargaining is decreed by statuteP in the conventional sense in which
that term is used in industrial relations, then there is a certain
restraint or persuasion, and therefore, an invasion of the board's
legislative authority.
It is submitted that if the "rules" of bargaining in good faith do
not force the school board to give up its ultimate responsibility for
making a decision, there is no infringement on legislative authority
just because good faith bargaining dictates that a certain technique of
procedure is to be used. It cannot be gainsaid that such rules of
procedure do put a certain type of compulsion upon the board which
does not exist if the board can "meet and confer" as it pleases. It
does, however, seem unrealistic to contend that the imposition of such
rules of procedure infringes upon legislative authority, unless the rules
cause the school board to capitulate to demands.
This article has already cautioned about the danger of
infringement upon the legislative authority of the school board if a
24. Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483,
494, 155 N.W.2d 78, 83 (1967).
25. Instead of the "conferences and negotiations" requirement of § 111.70 of the
Wisconsin statute.
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state labor relations board or state court should arrive at erroneous
conclusions as to the necessity of making concessions, offering
counterproposals or looking into the reasonableness of negotiated
terms. It is now necessary to set forth other negotiating techniques
which the NLRB and the federal courts have stated are dictated by
the concept of good faith bargaining so that it might be determined
whether these techniques require the school board to surrender its
ultimate decision-making power and thus infringe upon the board's
legislative authority.
An employer cannot come to the bargaining table and assume the
position that he will listen attentively to all proposals, and if he hears
anything to which he can agree, he will so indicate.2 Furthermore, a
party cannot enter negotiations with the announcement: "We don't
want to waste time, so we will tell you in advance that we will never
sign any contract which does not contain the terms which we will now
name." 27 For instance, if this rule were applied to a school board
bargaining technique, the board could not open negotiations with a
proposal that the contract must contain a clause giving sole control
over class load and size of the board. The technique is not good faith
bargaining, since it constitutes a "take it or leave it" approach.2 8 It
indicates to the other party that it cannot have any agreement unless
it consents to the inclusion of a significant term in the contract about
which the proposer will not bargain. The United States Supreme
Court has pointed out that parties must evidence a willingness to
agree.2 9 The "take it or leave it" approach does not harmonize with
such philosophy.
On the other hand, if an employee representative demanded a
binding arbitration clause and the school board responded 'that "we
will tell you now that we will reserve sole control over class load and
size," such a response would not seem to constitute a violation of the
concept of good faith negotiations. Firmness on one or more issues
when the whole record reveals no intent to dodge the obligation to
bargain in good faith is no violation of the requirement 0
It is possible that employment relations boards or courts could
26. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
27. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
28. In the early case of Highland Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939), enforced, 110 F.2d
632 (4th Cir. 1940), collective bargaining was interpreted to include an obligation to enter into
discussion or negotiations with an open and fair mind and with a sincere purpose to find a basis
for agreement concerning issues raised.
29. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
30. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).

248
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apply the prohibition against a "take it or leave it" technique to a
situation in such a way as to suggest that some counterproposal in the
form of a concession is necessary. The philosophy of the General
Electric3 t case, decided by the NLRB, may illustrate such an
application. In that case the union presented its demands. The
company asked for time to study them. After a reasonable time for
study, the company returned to negotiations. It announced that it had
a policy of continuing year-round research and always did the best it
could for employees. It then stated its counterproposal and announced
it would not depart from this proposal unless the union could
demonstrate that the company had made an error or that there had
been some intervening change in circumstances. The NLRB saw in
this an approach akin to a "take it or leave it" attitude and seemed
to sound a warning of violation of good faith if at an early stage in
negotiations a party finalizes a wide range of counterproposals 2
There is no doubt whatever that an employer can in due course,
after good faith bargaining, put forth a final offer and carry it
through to an impasse 3 Parties do not have to engage in fruitless
marathon sessions at the expense of a frank statement and support of
position.' The unilateral granting of a benefit before an impasse is a
circumvention of the duty to bargain and is held to be as bad as a flat
5
refusal .
If an impasse does develop, certain acts have been held to violate
the dictates of good faith negotiating. Unilateral action on the part of
an employer may violate the concept. If an employer grants benefits
that have never been discussed at the bargaining table, this constitutes
a violation of the good faith requirement3 A number of decisions
have found no violation after an impasse, however, if the employer
granted something which had been discussed during negotiations and
which the employer at such time had indicated he would grant 1 The
31. 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
32. There were other things that General Electric did which would make it possible to
explain the outcome on the basis of totality of conduct adding up to bad faith in negotiations,
However, board member Jenkins, in a concurring opinion, stated flatly that he felt the NLRB
%%ould have condemned the counterapproach as an indication of bad faith in negotiations even
if other elements had not been involved in the case. The case was appealed, but no decision has
been rendered because of involvement in certain procedural difficulties.
33. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1964).
34. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
35. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
36. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc.. 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
37. NLRB v. United States Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610 (Ist Cir. 1963); NLRB v.
Intracoastal Terminal, Inc. 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961); Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v.
NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950).
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courts recognized that such action would not seriously discourage
membership in employee organizations. Many unilateral actions are
condemned as evidencing bad faith in negotiations because they tend
to convey to employees that the employee organization did not play a
major role in securing a benefit from the employer. If an impasse is
broken by a party submitting a realistically new proposal, there is a
duty to resume negotiations.
When a contract is finally negotiated, the duty to bargain on
modification of terms is suspended until a reasonable time before
termination or until a re-opening date if the contract contains such
date.3 8 A negotiated contract is likely to spell out procedure for
handling grievances that arise under its terms. The last step in such
procedure may call for final decision by an impartial arbitrator.
An effort may be made by one of the parties during the term of
the contract to add to the agreement instead of modifying or changing
terms. The concept of good faith in bargaining does not require
negotiations in such a situation if the matter which the party wishes
39
to add was discussed at the time of contract negotiations.
Negotiations, however, are decreed by the concept of good faith
bargaining if a party wishes to add to the agreement during its life a
provision which falls within the mandatory subject matter area and
was never discussed at the time of negotiating the agreement.'" It is
possible for the parties to use clear language in a negotiated
agreement so as to avoid any need to bargain on adding terms during
the span of an existing contract. Industry refers to this kind of
provision as "zipper clause." The following is an example of such a
clause: the employer and the association, for the life of this
agreement, each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the rights, and
each agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain
collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred to, or
covered in this agreement, or with respect to any subject or matter not
specifically referred to or covered in this agreement even though such
subject or matter may not have been within the knowledge or
contemplation of either or both of the parties at the time that they
negotiated or signed the agreement.
38. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d). 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), prescribes rules in
respect to negotiations prior to efforts to modify or terminate an existing contract. A state
statute could very wisely do so in the field of public employment.
39. NLRB v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 100 N.L.R.B. 689 (1952).
40. NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951). enjorced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1952).
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Good faith bargaining demands a realistic interchange of reasons,
information and data. Parties are not expected to bargain in the
dark!'
It is submitted now that none of these techniques of good faith
bargaining, with one possible exception, are of the sort that infringe
upon the ultimate authority of the school board. The prescribed
procedures do put a certain type of compulsion upon the board, but
not to the extent of infringing upon legislative authority. The one
possible exception can be found in the NLRB's condemnation of the
General Electric12 approach as a "take it or leave it" attitude. In this
respect it should be remembered that General Electric was entirely
willing to give reasons for the positions it took in its proposal.
It was suggested in a previous paragraph that a negotiated
contract might provide a procedure for settling grievances which
culminates in binding arbitration. The issue as to whether binding
arbitration for such purpose constituted an infringement upon the
legislative authority of a municipality was faced directly by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.13 The court stated emphatically that there
was no infringement. It pointed out that in all its arguments the city
made the mistake of assuming that arbitration to dictate the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement was involved. The court stressed
that a provision to arbitrate disputes that arise under the terms of a
contract which the parties have voluntarily negotiated is something
entirely different. The court took cognizance of the fact that both
parties may desire to provide for arbitration rather than to be forced
to litigate through the judicial system.
Attention now needs to be given to a few remaining matters.
Early in this article it was indicated that discussion would center on a
statute which would provide for "good faith negotiating on wages,
hours and other conditions of employment." Since the term
"conditions of employment" is broad, the NLRB and the federal
courts have focused on the issue as to what subjects fall within the
term so that it can be said that bargaining about them is mandatory.
The landmark case in the area is NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg4 decided by the United States Supreme Court.
Warner Corporation,
41. For an expression of this philosophy, see Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954),
enlorcement deniei, 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955), rev'd. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
42. 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
43. Local 1226, Rhinelander City Employees v. City of Rhinelander. 35 Wis. 2d 209. 151
N.W.2d 30 (1967).
44. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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The Court divided the subjects into those which are illegal and cannot
be bargained about, those which are voluntary and can be bargained
about, and those which are mandatory and must be bargained about.
The concept that it is illegal to bargain about some subject
matter is very important in the area of public employment. This idea
recognizes that bargaining often collides with existing statutes and
cannot disregard them. Even when this collision takes place, however,
there may be considerable opportunity for intermediate negotiations.
For example, a state statute may specify the reasons for dismissal of a
tenure teacher. Although bargaining could not be used to change
those reasons, it could be used to set up some intermediate grievance
procedure if the state statute did not prohibit such bargaining.
In the industrial field the trend of court decisions has been
constantly to expand the area of mandatory negotiations. It is still
recognized, however, that there are some fundamental management
rights which need not be negotiated. Justice Stewart in his concurring
opinion in Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. NLRB,45 in
which the Supreme Court best explains, why it supports the legality of
collective bargaining, takes special pains to set forth some examples.
One illustration is the right to determine the scope of the business
enterprise. Stewart admits that decisions in this field would have some
relationship to conditions of employment, but he asserts that they lie
at the "core of entrepreneurial control," and therefore, the employer
does not have to bargain about them.
Similar decisions will be made in the field of public employeremployee bargaining. It can be expected that many state courts will
follow the trend of the federal courts in working with fact situations
in the industrial field and bring more and more subjects within the
area of mandatory negotiations. The struggle will be in the area of the
right of teachers to bargain for a role in the hiring, promoting and
transfer process. Another field for debate will be the right to bargain
about choice of textbooks, curriculum and other aspects of the
instructional program. Since teachers are trained professionals, it is
entirely probable that administrative boards and courts can be
influenced to feel that decisions relative to the instructional program
should be treated as falling within a concept such as "conditions of
employment." Indeed, a similar argument may succeed in respect to
permitting teachers to bargain for a role in connection with hiring and
promotion. Since the question of "board right" is likely to be
somewhat uncertain, it is predictable that some states will specify the
45.. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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right by statute in a more specific way than the mere use of the
general direction that negotiations are to be on "wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment."
Even if the employment relations boards and the courts become
very liberal in defining the mandatory subjects for bargaining, it does
not seem logical to assert that this would infringe upon the legislative
authority of the school board. The direction will be only to bargain,
and as previously indicated, the school board will not be forced to
capitulate to demands.
When statutes decree good faith bargaining in the public
employment sector, they usually provide for mediation and factfinding if an impasse is reached. They also order fact-finding if an
administrative board finds a refusal to bargain in good faith. It
cannot be said that provisions for mediation and fact-finding infringe
upon school board authority. Neither the mediator nor the fact finder
is given power to order the board to write terms into a contract. The
type of fact-finding provision found in statutes calls for only an
advisory opinion.
CONCLUSION

The assumption has been that state employment relations boards
and courts will not require any more by way of good faith professional
negotiation on wages, hours and conditions of employment than have
the National Labor Relations Board, the federal courts and the
United States Supreme Court in interpreting the requirement for good
faith bargaining under the Labor Management Relations Act. If this
is so and if state agencies and courts are not misled to believe that the
concept of good faith in negotiations dictates concessions,
counterproposals to every demand, and a review cff the reasonableness
of negotiated terms, it is submitted that statutes ordering school
boards to negotiate in good faith on wages, hours and conditions of
employment do not infringe upon school board authority and,
therefore, should withstand any constitutional test.
The trend is running in favor of giving public employees
statutory protection for the right to negotiate in good faith. School
boards ought to be sufficiently enlightened to see that it would be
unwise to try to block the progress of legislation by asserting an
invasion of their authority. A statute couched in the terms indicated
will not take away from school boards the ultimate power to make
decisions. The boards can well afford to remember fhe philosophy of
the United States Supreme Court relative to the merit of collective
bargaining: although it is not possible to say whether a satisfactory
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solution could be reached, national labor policy is founded upon
congressional determination that the chances are good enough to
warrant subjecting issues to the process of collective negotiations.46
Were school boards to understand that bargaining does not
require capitulation but is calculated to bring about harmony and
build morale, they would seldom reject a proposed subject on the
ground that it is not within the mandatory area of bargaining.
It may be said that good faith collective negotiations require
recognition by both parties, not merely formal but real, that
bargaining is a shared process in which each party has a right to play
an active role. Each party balances what is desired against known
costs of unresolved disagreement. These costs on the one side may be
such things as loss of competent employees and the fostering of a
general low morale, and on the other side the loss of community
support if unreasonable demands are made. There is nothing inherent
in the technique of good faith collective negotiations which mitigates
against producing a climate that will insure better education for
children.
In conclusion, it seems appropriate to point out that if statutes
require good faith collective negotiations, they also must contain
realistic enforcement provisions which can be employed against a
party showing bad faith. A discussion of appropriate provisions is
beyond the scope of this article.
46.
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